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Evaluating Cloud Deployment Scenarios Based on 
Security and Privacy Requirements 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Migrating organisational services, data and 
application on the Cloud is an important strategic 
decision for organisations due to the large number of 
benefits introduced by the usage of cloud computing, 
such as cost reduction and on demand resources. 
Despite, however, of the many benefits, there are 
challenges and risks for cloud adaption related to 
(amongst others) data leakage, insecure APIs, and 
shared technology vulnerabilities. These challenges 
need to be understood and analysed in the context of 
an organisation’s security and privacy goals and 
relevant cloud computing deployment models. 
Although, the literature provides a large number of 
references to works that consider cloud computing 
security issues, no work has been provided, to our 
knowledge, which supports the elicitation of security 
and privacy requirements and the selection of an 
appropriate cloud deployment model based on such 
requirements. This work contributes towards this gap.  
In particular, we propose a requirements engineering 
framework to support the elicitation of security and 
privacy requirements and the selection of an 
appropriate deployment model based on the elicited 
requirements. Our framework provides a modelling 
language that builds on concepts from requirements, 
security, privacy and cloud engineering and a 
systematic process. We use a real case study, based 
on the Greek National Gazette, to demonstrate the 
applicability of our work.  
 
Keywords: cloud, cloud deployment model, security 
requirements, privacy requirements, cloud migration. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The term “cloud computing” has positively 
invaded our lives providing a number of 
technological capabilities that have enhanced the way 
we perform every-day tasks.  Various well-known 
services such as email, data storage, web content 
management, are among the many that can be offered 
via a cloud environment. Although many of these 
services were offered, through the Internet, before the 
cloud era, the cloud computing environment 
significantly improves the degree of scalability, 
flexibility and resource pooling availability, therefore 
significantly assisting improved and efficient 
performance and availability [1,2]. 
  However, the buzz that has been created in the 
technological world has not been transformed to the 
domination of the technology to the real world. One 
of the main issues seems to be the uncertainty and 
(lack of) trust of organisations and individuals about 
cloud computing and the (lack of) understanding of 
all the parameters that can affect an organisation 
when migrating their services and data into the cloud. 
A recent survey [3], conducted by a document 
management software company revealed that 41% of 
senior IT professionals don’t know what cloud 
computing really is. From the remaining 59% of IT 
professionals who stated that they know what cloud 
computing is, 17% of them understand cloud 
computing to be internet-based computing while 11% 
believe it is a combination of internet-based 
computing, software as a service (SaaS), software on 
demand, an outsourced or managed service and a 
hosted software service. The remaining respondents 
understand cloud computing to be a mixture of the 
above. 
Another major concern is that of security. In fact, 
many organisations and individuals are still avoiding 
cloud services mostly because they are not sure if the 
services provided, by different providers, are suitable 
for their security and privacy requirements. This is 
especially true for organisations since they would 
have to hand in highly sensitive personal and 
organizational data and enable running of business-
critical applications into service providers over which 
they have no control. This introduces an extra layer 
of complexity on top of the expected security and 
privacy issues that are present in any type of software 
systems and services whether on the cloud or not. 
These concerns increase the risk factor of a potential 
migration to the cloud or integration of a cloud 
solution to an existing IT infrastructure. 
The literature [2, 4, 5] has recently provided 
examples of research efforts that consider security 
and privacy within the cloud computing context. 
These works have mostly been focused on identifying 
security/privacy specific threats and vulnerabilities 
for the cloud, identify specific attacks to cloud 
infrastructure, considering specific protocols that can 
support security and privacy in the cloud. On the 
other hand, very little work, if any, has taken place in 
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 2 
the area of security and privacy requirements 
elicitation and analysis for the cloud. Although, a 
large number of research efforts [2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10] 
have been reported in the literature to deal with 
security and privacy requirements analysis and 
reasoning, but most of these works do not consider 
cloud related characteristics. Security and privacy in 
the context of cloud computing requires techniques 
different to those provided by the existing literature, 
due to several unique issues of cloud computing such 
as the infrastructure and computational resources 
used by the user can be owned and operated by an 
outside cloud provider, users data is generally stored 
in a multi-tenant platform that is, most of the times, 
out of user control, and there is a new type of 
dependency with an outside provider within the 
existing business model.  It is, therefore, necessary to 
develop techniques that identify and analyse security 
and privacy requirements from both user and 
provider perspectives and to select appropriate 
deployment model that align with the requirements 
focusing on the organizational needs. Techniques that 
will be based on appropriate modelling languages 
that will enable modelling of concepts that are unique 
in the cloud, and will support reasoning and analysis 
of security and privacy properties taking into account 
the unique characteristics of the cloud context. Our 
work aims to fill in this gap. In particular, we have 
developed a framework that supports elicitation and 
analysis of security and privacy requirements within 
a cloud computing context, and the reasoning of 
different cloud deployment models based on the 
relevant security and privacy requirements.  
Section 2 presents cloud computing and it 
discusses security and privacy properties relate to it, 
focusing on cloud computing specific security and 
privacy properties. Section 3 presents our framework, 
and in particular its metamodel and process. Section 
4 introduces a real case study and it demonstrates the 
applicability of our framework to that case study. 
Section 5 presents related work and Section 6 
concludes the paper and points out areas for future 
research.  
 
2. Cloud Computing 
 
There is a lot of discussion and various 
definitions presented in the literature regarding Cloud 
Computing. Amongst those definition we have 
considered one provided by the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST), according to 
which: “Cloud computing is a model for enabling 
convenient, on-demand network access to a shared 
pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., 
networks, servers, storage, applications, services) 
that can be rapidly provisioned and released with 
minimal management effort or service provider 
interaction.”. We do not argue that this definition is 
better or worse than others, but we believe that this is 
a definition of cloud computing that is applicable 
within the context of our work.  
 
2.1 Cloud Service and Deployment 
Models  
 Cloud computing is based on three fundamental 
models [11-13]: Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), 
Platform as a Service (PaaS) and Software as a 
Service (SaaS). Following an IaaS model, 
organisations outsource equipment (e.g. storage, 
servers, networking) to support their operations. The 
equipment is owned by the service provider, who is 
responsible for running and maintaining it. In a PaaS 
model, a computer platform along with deployment 
of associated set of software applications is provided 
by a service provider to an organization. In a SaaS 
model, service providers host applications, which are 
made available over the network. In the cloud, IaaS is 
the most basic and each higher model abstracts from 
the details of the lower models. 
According to NIST, Cloud computing 
deployment models “broadly characterize the 
management and disposition of computational 
resources for delivery of services to consumers, as 
well as the differentiation between classes of 
consumers”. In a public cloud, service providers 
make resources, such as applications and storage, 
available to the general public over the Internet. 
Some well-known examples of public clouds include 
Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2), Google 
AppEngine and Windows Azure Services Platform. 
Private clouds are employed to support services of an 
organization without sharing resources with any other 
entity. The actual infrastructure that supports the 
cloud could be physically located in the 
organisation’s premises, or outside of its premises in 
the service providers’ premise. A Community cloud 
runs in service of a community of organizations, 
having the same deployment characteristics as private 
clouds. A Hybrid cloud is a combination of public, 
private, and community clouds. Hybrid clouds 
leverage the capabilities of each cloud deployment 
model. Each part of a hybrid cloud is connected to 
the other by a gateway, controlling the applications 
and data that flow from each part to the other.  
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2.2 Security and Privacy in the cloud 
Security and privacy issues are among the most 
important concerns in cloud computing, as large 
amounts of personal and other sensitive data are 
managed in the cloud. Several surveys among 
potential cloud adopters indicate that security and 
privacy is the primary concern hindering its adoption 
[14]. Security Company Symantec, commissioned a 
study for their 2011 State of the Cloud survey, to 
examine organizations that are adopting cloud 
computing. The survey found that security was 
considered as both the top goal and top concern by 
those organizations. Therefore, it is necessary to 
understand and analyze the relevant security and 
privacy issues before adopting cloud computing into 
existing infrastructure. 
The storage of personal and sensitive information 
in the cloud raises concerns about the security and 
privacy of such information and how much the cloud 
can be trusted. Security and privacy in this context 
requires solutions very different to those provided by 
current research efforts and industrial practices. 
Solutions that will not only try to guarantee security 
and/or privacy from a technical point of view, but 
solutions that provide clear understanding of the 
social aspects of security and privacy and take into 
account, for example, organisational structures, 
privacy needs and appropriate laws and regulations.  
In a traditional IT infrastructure set up, an 
organisation’s infrastructure is in a known and trusted 
environment, being either physically located within 
the organization’s on-premise facilities and/or 
directly managed by the organization. As such, the 
Organisation is in control of its infrastructure. When 
an organisation’s infrastructure (wholly or partially) 
migrate to the cloud, that infrastructure including 
relevant applications and stored data are in an 
environment that is separated, managed and 
maintained externally to the organisation. Therefore, 
due to such scenario, the organisation loses control 
over all or parts of its infrastructure. As an example, 
consider an organisation that moves a legacy system 
to the cloud giving up system administrative control 
and processes over the networking infrastructure, 
including servers, access to logs, incident response 
and patch management. With respect to security, such 
scenario extends the traditional IT infrastructure 
security beyond the organisation’s firewall, requiring 
consideration and review of additional attributes that 
include data locality, data integrity, data transfer, data 
privacy and recovery. As such, there are two main 
categories where security concerns and issues are 
raised: the security issues faced by the organization 
and the security issues faced by the cloud provider. 
 There is no one-size fits all approach to security 
as different cloud models (IaaS, PaaS and SaaS) each 
have different security risks. The Cloud Service 
Provider (CSP) and the user organization’s security 
duties differ greatly between the cloud models. 
Measures must be taken to ensure that the customer 
organization has the same visibility and control of 
their applications and data in the cloud model. 
Furthermore, new legal and regulatory issues include 
regulatory compliance and auditing which further add 
to the complexity. 
 
3. Incorporating security and 
privacy requirements in the 
cloud under a unified 
framework 
 
3.1 Framework Modelling Language 
Security and privacy are two concepts that are usually 
dealt, during system analysis and design, either 
separately or privacy is considered as a sub-set of 
security. However, various recent research works (see 
for example [6], [24]) have identified that privacy 
itself is a multifaceted concept that depends on 
various privacy-related requirements. Nevertheless, 
security and privacy serve common goals and 
purposes especially regarding the trust and safety 
levels of the users and the respective data. Also they 
share some common implementation solutions that 
satisfy both security and privacy (e.g. encryption 
mechanisms). Thus modelling security and privacy 
under a unified framework and examining their 
possible interrelations in analysis and design level is 
of vital importance. 
 The proposed framework consists of two main 
components: A modeling language and a process. 
The language is based on concepts from requirements 
engineering, and in particular of the i* [15] language, 
security requirements engineering, and in particular 
concepts from the Secure Tropos [16] language, 
privacy requirements engineering, and in particular 
from the PRiS [6,17] language, enhanced with 
concepts related to cloud computing. We have chosen 
Secure Tropos and PriS, from a large number of 
different existing security and privacy requirements 
engineering methodologies, because these methods 
share similar concepts from the early stage of the 
development, such as actors, goals, constraints, and 
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 4 
requirements from two complimentary different 
perspectives, i.e., security and privacy. In particular, 
Secure Tropos focuses on the elicitation and analysis 
of security requirements while PriS focuses 
specifically on the incorporation of privacy 
requirements in the system design process and 
identifies implementation techniques to support the 
requirements.  Secure Tropos considers the social 
dimension of security but does not focus on privacy 
concept and the implementation solution of the 
elicited requirements. PriS contributes on this 
direction; in particular the method considers the 
privacy issues and transforms the identified 
requirements into the implementation solutions. 
Therefore, such integration allows us a framework 
that provides coverage from the organizational 
context, cloud properties, security and privacy goals 
and requirements to select suitable cloud deployment 
model to support the requirements.  As a result, the 
framework’s modeling language supports elicitation 
and analysis of security and privacy requirements 
within a cloud computing context, and a systematic 
way of-working for translating these requirements to 
select appropriate cloud deployment models. The 
metamodel shown in Figure 1 represents the abstract 
syntax of our language.  
We employ the concept of an actor to describe an 
entity that has strategic goals and intentions within a 
system or an organisational setting [15]. An actor can 
be an individual, a system or an organisation. An 
actor provides a service and requires an 
infrastructure. We also define a special class of an 
actor, a cloud actor. A cloud actor is an actor that 
demonstrates two unique attributes, a deployment 
model and a service model. We also differentiate a 
special class of an actor, a malicious actor. A 
malicious actor’s intention is to introduce threats to 
the system, which exploit vulnerabilities. 
Vulnerabilities are defined as weaknesses or flaws, in 
terms of security and privacy. Vulnerabilities are 
exploited by threats, as an attack or incident within a 
specific context. For instance, unauthorised access to 
hypervisor introduces a virtual-machine escape threat 
[18]. This attack is associated with the computing 
resources on the IaaS level and may happen in all 
deployment models. It is worth stating that legitimate 
actors might unintentionally introduce vulnerabilities 
to a system due to failure or mistakes. Threats pose 
potential loss or indicate problems that can put the 
actor at risk. Threats can be of different types related 
to security and privacy, such as provider data misuse, 
virtual machine replication, and unavailability of 
data, insecure storage, and DoS. On the other hand, 
actors within the system environment have single or 
multiple goals. A Goal represents an actors’ strategic 
interests [19]. Higher level strategic goals may be 
decomposed in simpler operational goals forming 
AND/OR goals hierarchy. Our meta-model 
differentiates between organizational, security and 
privacy goals. Examples of security goals are: 
Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability while for 
privacy goals are: Anonymity, Unlinkability and 
Unobservability [20-21]. These goals introduce 
security and privacy constraints. A constraint is used 
to represent a set of restrictions that do not permit 
specific actions to be taken, restrict the way that 
actions can be taken or prevent certain system 
objectives from being achieved [16]. Security and 
privacy constraints are clearly defined as separate 
concepts to support a clear and well-structured 
elicitation and analysis of security and privacy 
requirements. When a constraint is introduced, 
further analysis is required to establish if and how 
that constraint can be satisfied. Within the context of 
our metamodel, a constraint is satisfied by a measure. 
A measure represents a generic, implementation 
independent form of control that indicates how a 
constraint will be achieved. Measures are 
implemented by relevant mechanisms. A mechanism 
is defined as a technical solution that realizes one or 
more measures. Mechanisms require resources and 
they support services. A resource supports an 
infrastructure.  
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Figure 1.  Metamodel for Cloud Computing Security and Privacy Concepts  
 
3.2 The Process  
We propose a process based on the underlying 
concepts used within the presented language. The aim 
of the process is to provide a structured approach for 
the elicitation and analysis of security and privacy 
requirements, and to support the selection of 
appropriate deployment models based on the 
identified requirements and relevant security and 
privacy mechanisms. The process assists in the 
understanding of specific organisational needs for 
cloud migration. The process consists of three 
iterative activities: organizational analysis, Security 
and Private Requirements Analysis, and selection of 
deployment model. Figure 2 depicts the activities and 
the resulting artefacts of the proposed process.  
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deployment 
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Deployment Scenario 
Description
Deployment Scenario 
Selection
Security and Privacy 
Deployment Analysis
Activity Step
legend
Organisational 
Entities Identification · ACTORS
· GOALS
· SERVICES
· INFRASTRUCTURE
· CLOUD MIGRATION 
NEEDS
· SECURITY AND 
PRIVACY GOALS
· SECURITY AND 
PRIVACY 
CONSTRAINTS
DEPLOYMENT 
SCENARIO TEMPLATE
output
Security and Privacy 
Requirements 
Definition
Figure 2. Security and Privacy Requirements Engineering Process for Cloud 
Activity 1: Organisational Analysis 
The Organisational Analysis activity supports 
understanding of the organisational needs for the 
deployment of a cloud based infrastructure. The 
activity aims to identify those parts of the 
organisations services and processes that need to be 
delivered over the cloud. In doing so, the activity 
includes identification of key entities such as actors, 
goals, plans, resources, and services.   
 
Step 1.1: Organisational Entities Identification 
This step aims to understand the current 
organisational structure based on the identification of 
entities such as actors, goals, plans, resources, 
services and infrastructure. Such understanding 
introduces the foundations required for the latest 
activities and steps of the proposed framework.  
It is important to note that the extent of the 
identification of entities depends on the extent to 
which the organisation aims to consider migration to 
the cloud. For example, if only one service of the 
organisation is considered for migration, for instance 
the email service, then an identification of entities 
relevant to that service would suffice. On the other 
hand, if a full migration is considered then the 
identification should include the whole of the 
organisation and any external entities that might 
affect some migration. 
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In our work, we consider an organisation which 
has a set of actors who have some common goals. 
These are the organisational goals that support the 
overall objective and business needs of the 
organisation. These goals can be initially high level 
goals that can be refined to provide more explicit 
goals.  
 
Step 1.2: Cloud Organisational Needs  
This step aims to identify the explicit 
organisational structures, services, application and 
data that should be deployed in the cloud. For 
example, going back to the email service provided as 
an example in the previous step, the exact details of 
whether the whole email service, or if just some of 
the applications and/or data should be deployed in the 
cloud should be identified at this step. To support 
such identification, the organisation needs to consider 
how such deployment would affect the organisation 
internally, for example whether existing policies, 
roles and responsibilities and the organisation’s 
business strategy would need to be modified; how 
such change might affect (positively or negatively) 
customer handling and customer services; and 
develop a clear understanding of the benefits and 
limitations of such deployment.  
 
Activity 2: Security and Privacy 
Requirements Analysis  
During this activity, an analysis takes place 
related to the security and privacy requirements of the 
organisation. We define two steps within this activity, 
the Security and Privacy Goal Identification and the 
Security and Privacy Requirements definition. The 
output of this activity is a set of security and privacy 
requirements modelled in terms of security and 
privacy constraints for each actor of the 
organisational analysis.  
 
Step 2.1 Security and Privacy Goal Identification  
Once the organisational needs for cloud 
deployment have been identified, the next activity 
involves the analysis of security and privacy 
requirements related to the organisational cloud 
deployment needs. Security and privacy needs are 
identified based on the security and privacy goals that 
the organisation has. It is therefore important to fist 
identify the relevant security and privacy 
organisational goals. If the organisation has a security 
and privacy policy that information could be 
extracted from the policy. Relevant laws and 
regulations can also be considered to identify the set 
of security and privacy goals. It is important to note 
that the aim is not to “blindly” use any security and 
privacy goal that the literature has captured but to 
identify those that are relevant to the organisational 
parts that are considered for deployment in the cloud.  
 
Step 2.2 Security and Privacy Requirements 
Definition 
Once the relevant security and privacy goals 
have been identified, an elicitation and analysis 
process for security and privacy requirements is 
employed. We base our analysis on the concepts of 
security and privacy constraints, as defined in the 
presented metamodel, to enable developers to 
adequately capture security and privacy requirements. 
In the context of our work a security constraint is 
defined as a restriction, related to security, imposed 
to one or more actors and which restricts the actor 
from performing certain actions [16]. Similarly, a 
privacy constraint introduces restrictions related to 
privacy. Security and Privacy constraints are elicited 
from internal to an organisation sources (such as 
organisational policies, goals, and business 
processes), external sources (such as laws and 
regulations, possible external threats identified), and 
relevant technological restrictions based on the 
technology used (such as constraints that might be 
unique for cloud computing environments). It is 
important to establish the relationship between 
organisational goals and security/privacy constraints. 
In other words, it is important to know what 
organisational goals a security/privacy constraint is 
restricting. This allows us to have a clear 
understanding of the security and privacy constraints 
introduced due to specific organisational goals, and 
enable us to easily evaluate the organisational 
security and privacy constraints, in cases where 
organisational goals change. It is also worth noting 
that security and privacy constraints are the same 
irrespective of specific cloud deployment models 
since they represent security and privacy 
requirements. To support this step, we realise a  
Security and Privacy Goal Diagram based on the 
Secure Tropos methodology [16].    
 
Activity 3: Selection of deployment model  
The main aim of this activity is to support the 
selection of the appropriate deployment model for the 
cloud migration. The activity has three main steps: 
Deployment Scenario Description; Security and 
Privacy Deployment Analysis; Deployment Scenario 
Selection. To support this activity, we have 
developed a Deployment Model Selection template. 
The template, shown in appendix A, consists of two 
sections, which are filled in during the carried out of 
the activity’s two first steps. Section 1 is filled in 
during Step 1, while section 2 is filled in during step 
2. Then during step 3 an analysis of all templates is  
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carried out to select the preferred deployment 
scenario. The output of this activity is a complete 
selection template and the decision regarding the 
deployment model.   
 
Step 3.1:  Deployment Scenario Description  
During this step, a deployment scenario is 
identified and described. The description is based on 
information related to the deployment model to be 
used, the hosting model, the relevant services and 
resources to be deployed along with the relevant 
security and privacy requirements identified in the 
previous step. Relevant information is documented 
using the Deployment model selection template and 
in particular the following fields from Section 1:  
· Deployment Scenario Type. A specific type of 
deployment model is identified. In particular, the 
following deployment models can be selected: 
Private, Public, Hybrid, and Community.  
· Actors Involved. The actors involved in the 
specific scenario are listed.   
· Hosting Type. The hosting type is specified. 
Options include: On-premises, where the cloud is 
hosted within the Organisational firewall; Third-
party location, where the cloud is hosted outside 
the Organisational firewall.  
· Organisational Goals. The organisational goals 
identified in the previous activity, relevant to the 
scenario, are listed.  
· Security and Privacy Constraints. The security 
and privacy constraints from the previous 
activity, related to the scenario, are listed.   
 
Step 3.2: Security and Privacy Deployment 
Analysis 
For each scenario, a security and privacy deployment 
analysis takes place where vulnerabilities, threats, 
security and privacy mechanisms, are analysed for 
each scenario. In particular the analysis focuses on 
issues related to the specific deployment model and 
configuration of the analysed scenario. Threats and 
vulnerabilities can rise from unique cloud properties 
such as virtualization, computational resource, and 
unauthorized access to instance or virtual machine 
running on the same physical machine considering 
the identified deployment scenario. Once these have 
been identified, relevant security and privacy 
mechanisms are introduced to the model to evaluate 
countermeasures for the identified threats and 
vulnerabilities. The analysis is documented through 
the Security and Privacy Deployment Diagram, 
which is added to Section 2 of the template.  
 
Step 3.3: Deployment Scenario Selection  
This final step consists of evaluating all the available 
templates created in the previous two steps, and 
selecting the preferred deployment scenario. Within 
the context of our work, we suggest that the selection 
is based on the fulfilment of each model of the 
relevant security and privacy requirements, i.e. how 
the security and privacy requirements are fulfilled by 
the relevant security and privacy mechanisms that are 
applicable to the specific deployment model. 
However, we understand that such simplistic 
evaluation might not be applicable in all cases either 
due to more than one scenarios fulfil their security 
and privacy requirements, or due to the lack of a 
scenario fulfilling all the relevant security and 
privacy requirements. In that case, a number of other 
criteria can be employed. Although it is outside the 
scope of our work to enforce the criteria and process 
of selecting in such cases the preferred model, criteria 
could include cost related criteria (for example, how 
much each scenario will cost to deploy), customer 
related criteria (for example, which scenario best fits 
customer expectations), resource related criteria (for 
example, what resources are currently available from 
the organisation).   
 
4. Framework Application: The 
Greek National Gazette case 
study 
The proposed framework was applied on a real 
case study related to analysis of the migration of 
some services of the Greek National Gazette (GNG) 
to the cloud.  
 
Activity 1: Organisational Analysis 
The first step of the first activity of the proposed 
framework is to analyse the organisation and identify 
a number of entities that are important for further 
analysis in the following steps and activities. The 
main authority of the Greek National Gazette is to 
publish laws and other legal decisions on the 
Government’s Newspaper in order for these laws and 
decisions to be active and applicable. Besides legal 
decisions there are also a number of decision 
categories originated from the private and public 
sector that by law must be send for publication to the 
Government’s Newspaper.  In 2010 the National 
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 9 
Gazette decided to provide a service for electronic 
submission of the manuscripts send for publication. 
The whole process starts when a document is sent by 
a public/private sector organisation/company to the 
GNG. Every document that enters the National 
Gazette in order to be included in the Government’s 
official Newspaper follows a specific process. The 
first step of this process is the categorisation and 
scanning of the document. Categorization is based on 
two criteria: the source of the document and the 
subject of the document. The Government 
Newspaper has a number of volumes, on which 
documents are included for publication. The proper 
categorisation is very important since it will 
determine on which volume the specific document 
will be published. The next step of the process 
involves the assignment of the unique identification 
number to the document. This number assists for 
identification and search purposes and follows the 
document through the rest of the respective process. 
If the document’s source is companies from the 
private sector it is assigned an identification number 
different from those applied to document received by 
the public sector. Also, during this step a first 
electronic form of the document is registered to the 
NGs information system. The respective employee 
will enter into the system, besides the identification 
number, a brief description and a small summary of 
the document. These will be done manually from 
employees. In the next step of the process, the 
document is transformed from hard copy to electronic 
version (usually .DOC or .PDF formats). Usually the 
first scanned version requires a number of 
corrections. Thus, there is a recursive step between 
the OCR and the spelling corrections process until the 
document reaches its proper form and perfectly 
matches with the original hard copy. All this process 
is again conducted manually by the respective 
employees who constantly check every electronic 
version provided by the OCR, apply the corrections 
manually and again send it for the creation of the 
newer electronic version. Every electronic document 
which is finalised from the previous step is sent to the 
respective employee so as to be included in the 
respective issue under development based on the 
categorisation conducted before. The issue has a 
maximum number of documents that can be included 
but not a minimum one. For the construction of the 
issue a specific software tool is used which combines 
the available documents and organizes them in a way 
that the issue will be complete without redundant 
blank lines etc. Every issue is assigned a specific id 
called issue_id, which includes one or more 
documents (each identified by its document_id). The 
software outputs a first draft of the issue. Its context 
is not always correct. Thus, qualified employees 
format the issue manually until it gets its final form. 
In this stage an integrity check of the context of the 
issue is also conducted for verifying that no 
unauthorised changes have been made on every 
document included for publication in the respective 
issue. After taking its final form the issue is signed by 
the general secretary of the National Gazette and is 
send to the Government’s General Secretary for 
approval before proceeding for publication. The 
communication between the National Gazette and the 
Government’s General Secretary is conducted by 
internal mail and not electronically. The specific step 
is fulfilled when the issue has taken the final approval 
and returns back to National Gazette in order to 
proceed with the final steps before printing. The final 
stage includes several sub-steps. When the issue is 
approved for publication a new identification number 
is assigned on the issue which basically stops being 
an issue and becomes a paper volume with a specific 
volume_id along with a date and the number of pages 
the specific volume is formed of. The first draft of the 
volume is again formatted until it reaches its final 
version. Before proceeding on the printing phase a 
final integrity check is again conducted. During this 
check every document included in the volume is 
again compared with the original hard copy versions 
and the final acceptance is being given. After the 
final acceptance a pdf file is created with a digitally 
unsigned version of the volume. Then the pdf file is 
being printed through a specific software tool and the 
output of this substep is the volume along with the 
first date of publication an its printed date. Finally, 
this final version is again checked for any mistakes in 
the context or the format of the text and after that it is 
formatted with the respective logos and labels and is 
digitally signed by using RSA 128 bits algorithm. 
Finally, the digitally signed version of the volume is 
uploaded on the National Gazette’s portal with free 
access to all Internet users. A graphical illustration of 
the above process is shown in Figure 3.  
 
Output 1: ACTORS 
A number of actors can be identified by the 
above analysis: 
· Public Organisation Actor, which represents any 
public organisation that sends documents to the 
GNG; 
· Private Organisation (Company), which 
represents any non-public organisational that 
sends documents to the GNG; 
· GNG Employee, which represents an individual 
who works for the GNG. Such employees can be 
furthered categorised as Identification Actor 
(responsible for categorisation and scanning of a 
document), Electronic Registration Actor 
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(employee responsible for performing the first 
electronic registration of the document), 
Corrector Actor (employee responsible for 
correcting and validating the electronic version 
of the document against the original hard copy), 
Issue Editor Actor (responsible for adding 
documents to an issue);  
· GNG General Secretary, who is responsible for 
signing GNG issues; 
 
· Government General Secretary, who is 
responsible for approving the issues; 
· Publishing System, which represents the 
information system used to support the 
publication process 
· General Public, which represents any citizen 
wishing to access the Volumes (printed issues) 
 
Figure 3. Description of the current administrative procedure
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Output 2: GOALS 
Each one of the above actors has a number of 
goals that they try to achieve. For the purposes of this 
paper we just illustrate the most basic goals of each 
actor. For instance the main goal of the Public 
Organisation Actor is to publish all the decisions that 
by law need to be parts of the Nations paper in order 
to be valid. In order to achieve that goal, a number of 
relevant goals can be identified. For instance, the 
Public Organisation Actor needs to provide the 
relevant documents to the Greek National Gazette. In 
doing so, they need to format the documents 
following a specific template depending on the type 
of document they sent. That document needs also to 
be approved by the Public Organisation before it is 
sent to the GNG. The goals of the Private 
Organisation actor are similar. On the other hand, the 
main goal of the Publishing System is to support the 
publication process. In supporting that goal, the 
Publishing System actor has to receive the document, 
either from Public or Private Organisation actors, 
categorise the document, validate it, and publish it as 
part of a specific volume. Similar analysis has been 
employed for all the relevant actors and their main 
goals are shown below.  
The main goal of the Identification Actor is to 
correctly categorise a document and scan it (in case it 
has send to the GNG in a hardcopy form), while the 
main goal of the Electronic Registration actor is to 
correctly check the electronic version of the 
document and register the document to the GNG’s 
system. On the other hand, the main goal of the 
Publishing System is to support the publication 
process and the main goal of the General Public is to 
read GNG’s volumes. 
 
· Public Organisation Actor: Publish Decisions 
and Bills; Provide Document; Format Document; 
Approve Document.   
· Private Organisation Actor: Publish Bills; 
Provide Document; Format Document; Approve 
Document.  
· GNG Employee: Support the creation and 
publication process of every issue for the Greek 
Newspaper.  
· Identification Actor: Identify Document correctly 
–Scan document – Categorise Document. 
· Electronic Registration Actor: Perform first 
electronic registration – provide unique number. 
· Corrector Actor: Validate textual integrity of 
electronic document – Conduct small corrections 
– Communicate with the Public/Private 
Organisation to verify corrections.  
· Issue Editor Actor: Edit issue – Add documents 
– Ensure GNG rules regarding documents 
prioritisation in publishing process. 
· GNG General Secretary: Approve GNG issues - 
Conduct final integrity and format checks. 
· Government General Secretary: Approve GNG 
Issues for publication. 
· Publishing System: support publication process.  
· General Public: Read Newspaper of the Greek 
Government.  
 
 Output 3: SERVICES 
From the above analysis we can also identify a 
number of services related to the GNG’s publication 
process: 
· Receive documents; 
· Categorise and Identify documents; 
· Transfer documents to Electronic Form (if 
necessary); 
· Check and Validate Electronic Document against 
original hard copy; 
· Create issue (Draft Volume); 
· Publish Volume; 
· Make Volume available to general public. 
 
Output 4: INFRASTRUCTURE 
To support the above services and process, the 
National Gazette depends on an IT infrastructure that 
supports the following: Automated management of 
the Issue & Volume Composition; Work Flow 
Management; Internal – Administration Services; 
Internet Services.  
 
Automated management of the Issue & Volume 
Composition 
For accomplishing these tasks a number of 
subsystems exist which collaborate through the use of 
a workflow system. These subsystems are: 
 
· Information Collection Subsystem, which 
supports the collection of the document and its 
digital storage.  
· Sorting Subsystem, which supports the 
identification of the document and its sorting 
according to a set of criteria.   
· Control and Process Subsystem, which supports 
the correct format of the document (spelling, 
typos, document structure) and allocation to the 
correct issue. 
· Volume Composition Subsystem, which controls 
the issue for publication and stores the issues in 
the appropriate folders.  
· Type-Setting/Layout Subsystem, which supports 
the finalisation of an issue and adds relevant 
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typesetting details such as logos, page numbers 
and so on. When the Volume is ready it is 
automatically retrofitted to the Volume 
Composition System in order for the user to 
make any minor manual adjustments. 
 
The whole system records every process along 
with the respective stage, parameters and electronic 
files in an internal database which remains active for  
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Figure 4. Description of the workflow management system 
as long as it takes in order to process the volumes of a 
whole academic year. 
 
Workflow Management 
This system has been developed with the 
Zope/Plone platform, which provides proper 
Workflow Management System mechanisms and is 
responsible for the proper collaboration of the various 
components on the platform. The available 
applications are the DCWorkflow and the Openflow 
used for the management of static workflows and 
activity workflows respectively. A graphical 
representation is shown in Figure 4. 
 
Internal – Administration Services 
For providing these kind services to the internal 
users of the Information System the capabilities of 
the Automated management of the Issue & Volume 
Composition system are used along with respective 
query forms for conducting quick searches on old 
volumes and provide adequate information to 
citizens. Also a Report Management System is 
installed supported by the SQL Reporting Services 
tool which retrieves data from the various SQL 
databases located on an SQL Server and used from 
the National Gazette’s subsystems.  For developing 
the various reports the RDL XML-based template is 
used. 
 
Internet Services 
The Adobe InDesign software is being used in 
order to automatically create the final electronic 
version of the Volume after it has been printed in its 
final form. The Volume is stored in pdf and txt 
formats and also keywords are added for fastening 
and simplifying the search process. Then the Volume 
is digitally signed and published in the National 
Gazette’s web site.  
When external users are demanding data from 
the system the Plone Database which has the original 
data creates replicas with metadata on properly 
designed databases used specifically for the fast 
response to the demanding users. These databases 
serve both the internal and external zones of the 
system.  
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Figure 5. National Gazette’s IT architecture
A graphical representation of the whole National 
Gazette’s IT architecture is shown in Figure 5. 
 
Output 5: CLOUD MIGRATION NEEDS 
Following our framework, the second step of 
activity 1 aims to identify those services that need to 
be migrated to the cloud. In the case of the GNG, 
during our project, a decision was made to analyse 
those services that are considered external to the 
publication process, i.e. the Receipt of the Documents 
and the Publication of the Volume. Migrating these 
services to the cloud is important and necessary since 
these services are the most demanding and vital 
services of the GNG, since these are the main 
external services of the GNG providing support for 
the Public and Private Organisations and the Greek 
Citizens, while the rest of the services are mostly 
internal services regarding the publication of the 
documents. Currently, receiving the documents is 
based on a server that has to be active constantly for 
serving the public and private organisations. The 
demands on Infrastructure and machine capabilities 
change on a monthly basis since the publishing needs 
of the government and the organisations increase 
dramatically. Current infrastructure will fail to serve 
the correct and proper documents’ reception. 
Migrating this service on the cloud will solve the 
infrastructure limitations, sources’ constraints and 
backup issues with much lesser cost that the one 
needed for the GNG in order to be equipped with new 
infrastructure. Regarding the second service the 
reasons of migration are similar. Volumes’ 
availability will be better ensured in a cloud context 
rather than on dedicated servers that have specific 
processing capabilities and might introduce 
restrictions on simultaneous access from specific 
number of citizens. Cloud can offer combined 
infrastructures, on demand increase or decrease of the 
space and process sources depending on the time 
period without the GNG to be forced to buy new 
costly infrastructure thus saving money and time.        
 
Activity 2: Security and privacy 
requirements analysis  
 
Output 1: SECURITY AND PRIVACY GOALS  
As discussed in the previous section, the second 
activity of our framework aims to identify and 
analyse relevant security and privacy requirements. 
The first step of this activity aims to identify the 
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relevant security and privacy goals. For the GNG 
case study and relevant to the two identified services 
we have identified the following security and privacy 
goals: Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability 
(Security Goals) and Anonymity, Data Privacy and 
Unlikability (Privacy Goals). 
The Confidentiality goal is mandatory in 
order to ensure external’s user eligibility. Integrity is 
of vital importance as well since it must be ensured 
that non – authorised alterations of the documents, 
issues and volumes are allowed. Availability will 
ensure that the system will provide the proper 
mechanisms in order to be able to accept documents 
for publications as well as provide the published 
volumes to the Greek Citizens.  
Ensuring anonymity of GNG’s internal users 
is also important since the published volumes should 
not include any identifiable information of the users 
that worked in the publication process. The volumes 
should only be signed by the General Secretary and 
the respective politicians regarding the published 
documents in each volume. Data Privacy ensures that 
the private identifiable information of the external 
users that send documents to the GNG are safely 
stored along with the requested document and are 
conformed to the respective EU regulations regarding 
data manipulation and storage. Finally, unlinkability 
between the GNG and the external users should be 
realised when GNG authorisation system sends the 
authentication means to the external users in order to 
gain access to the submission system.  
 
 
Output 2: SECURITY AND PRIVACY 
CONSTRAINTS 
The next step according to the proposed 
framework is to identify and analyse relevant security 
and privacy requirements. As discussed in the 
previous section, in the context of our work we 
represent security and privacy requirements in the 
form of security and privacy constraints. We focus 
our analysis in two services as discussed above and to 
assist with the analysis we employ the Enhanced 
Security Actor Diagram from the Secure Tropos 
methodology. As indicated above, the GNG depends 
on the Public Organisation Actor to receive the 
document to be published. On the other hand, the 
Public Organisation Actor depends on the GNG actor 
to publish the document. Both these dependencies 
introduce a number of security and privacy 
constraints as shown in Figure 6. For example, the 
Receive Document dependency introduces the 
following constraints, i.e. Ensure System 
Availability, Ensure Document Integrity, Ensure 
Sender Eligibility, Ensure data privacy and Ensure 
User Unlinkability when providing authentication 
means to eligible users. On the other hand, the 
Publish Volume dependency introduces the following 
constraints, i.e. Ensure Volume Integrity, Ensure 
Volume Authenticity and Ensure Internal User 
Anonymity. There is also a dependency between the 
General Public Actor and the GNG, read National 
dependency, which introduces one more constraint, 
i.e. Ensure Issue Availability.  
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Figure 6. Security and Privacy Constraints for the GNG
Activity 3: Selection of deployment model 
 
According to the framework, the next activity 
involves the selection of the deployment model. In 
doing so, three different steps need to be followed. 
The first is related to the identification and 
description of relevant deployment scenarios. Once 
the scenarios to be considered have been defined, and 
documented in Section 1 of the relevant template, the 
next step involves the analysis of each one of these 
scenarios in terms of vulnerabilities, threats and 
security and privacy mechanisms. The Security and 
Privacy Deployment Diagram is used for that 
analysis and the resulting diagram is added to Section 
2 of the template. The third and final step involves 
the deployment scenario selection.  
 
Output 1: DEPLOYMENT SCENARIO 
TEMPLATE 
 
For the purposes of this paper we have decided 
to illustrate two different scenarios. Scenario 1 is 
based on a Public Cloud Deployment model, related 
to the receive document organisational goal of the 
Greek National Gazette. The relevant, to that goal, 
actors are the Public Organisation and the Private 
Organisation. Our analysis in the previous activity 
has concluded that relevant to the Receive Document 
goal, the GNG has a number of security and privacy 
constraints such as Ensure System Availability, 
Ensure Document Integrity, Ensure Sender 
Eligibility, Ensure Data Privacy and Ensure User 
Unlinkability when providing authentication means 
to eligible users. Moreover, for the purposes of this 
scenario we consider that the hosting of the cloud 
will be on a third party-location.  Section 1 of the 
template in appendix B illustrates the details of 
Scenario 1, while in Section 2 of that template, the 
security and privacy deployment analysis is 
illustrated with the aid of the Security and Privacy 
Deployment Diagram (SPDD).  
Security and Privacy Deployment Diagram 
(SPDD), shown also in Figure 10 for clarity, shows 
the GNG public cloud actor along with the various 
security and privacy constraints, vulnerabilities, 
threats, security and privacy features and security and 
privacy mechanisms related to the main goal of the 
scenario, i.e. Receive Document. In particular, The 
Receive Document goal is restricted by five different 
security and privacy constraints as discussed above. 
For the purposes of this paper, and to keep the 
analysis to a reasonably easy to understand level, we 
only illustrate in the template the analysis of three of 
them, i.e. Ensure System Availability, Ensure 
Document Integrity and Ensure User Unlinkability. 
The Ensure System Availability security constraint is 
endangered by the Cloud Server Operation 
vulnerability, which can be exploited by the Cloud 
Lack of Recovery and Cloud Long Term Viability 
threats. The former threat can be controlled by the 
Data Recovery security feature, while the latter threat 
can be controlled by the Data Synchronisation and 
Failure Reporting security features. A number of 
security mechanisms have been identified that 
implement these security features. For example, Data  
Synchronisation can be implemented by ACID 
(Atomicity, consistency, isolation, durability) 
properties mechanism or BASC (Basically Available, 
Soft State, Eventual Consistency) properties 
mechanism. Similarly, the Ensure User Unlinkability 
privacy constraint is endangered by two 
vulnerabilities, i.e. Plain Text transmission and 
Eavesdropping of data lines. These two 
vulnerabilities can be exploited by the Credential 
Linkage threat (the former vulnerability), and the 
Identity Disclosure threat (the latter vulnerability). 
Both threats can be controlled by the Anonymous 
Communication privacy feature, which can be 
implemented with a number of different privacy 
mechanisms such as Onion routing, Tor Architecture, 
Pseudonimisation, and VM Anonymity. Similar 
analysis is shown for the Ensure Document Integrity 
security constraint.   
Scenario 2 is based on a Private Cloud 
Deployment model, related to the same goal as 
scenario 1, i.e. the Receive Document organisational 
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goal. Because of that, this scenario has the same 
actors, and security and privacy constraints as 
Scenario 1 but a different hosting type model, i.e. the 
cloud is hosted on-premises. 
Appendix C illustrates the template of scenario 2. 
Our Analysis, as also shown in appendix C, 
illustrated that there are a number of common 
vulnerabilities, threats and security mechanisms on 
both scenarios. However, the private cloud scenario 
introduces some differences in terms of the 
vulnerabilities and the threats. In particular, Private 
clouds usually lead to an explosion in the number of 
VMs in existence, since organisations usually 
develop libraries of VMs to support quick 
deployment of new services. As a result, some VMs 
are created but never used or are used for a while and 
then go for a significant amount of time without 
usage. As such they might develop, due to the lack of 
application of routine software updates, critical 
vulnerabilities. As such, attackers can exploit that 
vulnerability by identifying insecure VMs. An 
important security measure related to that is the 
ability to monitor VM activity in order to identify 
abandoned VMs. Security mechanisms related to that 
are usually monitoring of log files and monitoring of 
user access records. Another vulnerability that is 
usually most commonly found in a private cloud is 
Personally Identifiable Information (PII). 
Organisations are more willing to store personal 
identifiable information (such as personnel records) 
to a cloud model they have control. However, that 
creates threats related to Identity Disclosure and 
Credential Linkage.    
As discussed in the previous section, once we 
have analysed all the different scenarios, the next step 
of the proposed framework is the selection of the 
appropriate deployment scenario. Looking at the two 
scenarios analysed above, it is important to note that 
there is no much difference in terms of the 
satisfaction of the related security and privacy 
requirements. In both deployment scenarios, the 
security and privacy requirements are endangered by 
quite few vulnerabilities, which in turn can be 
exploited by a rather large number of threats. 
Similarly, in both scenarios all threats can be 
mitigated using appropriate security and privacy 
features and relevant security and privacy 
mechanisms. So from that point of view, there are not 
much differences between the two scenarios. 
However, our analysis pointed out a fundamental 
difference. In the case of private cloud, a large 
number of vulnerabilities are related to malicious 
insiders such as Hijacking, and vulnerabilities related 
to the administration of the organisational data and 
resources, such as Abandoned VMs and Personally 
Identifiable Information. Our discussion with the 
relevant software engineers from the GNG indicated 
that these are vulnerabilities for which action can be 
easier taken than vulnerabilities where the GNG has 
no control of. Moreover, although for a large number 
of security and privacy mechanisms are the same in 
both scenarios, the staff from GNG believe it is better 
to have control of the implementation of these 
mechanisms rather than depend on third party 
providers. As such, the selected scenario between the 
two presented in Scenario 2, i.e. the private 
deployment scenario.     
 
5. Related Work 
 
There are a number of works that have already 
contributed requirements engineering method for 
security and privacy for the development of software 
systems. Mouratidis & Giorgini [16] propose Secure 
Tropos, an extension of Tropos methodology with the 
concepts of secure dependency, goal, plan, resource 
and constraint.  The approach supports the analysis of 
security from the Requirements Engineering phase.  
Houmb et al. introduce the SecReq approach to elicit, 
analyse the trace the security requirements from 
requirements engineering phase to design [7]. A 
misuse case driven approach is used to establish 
visual links between use cases and misuse cases for 
eliciting security requirements at an early stage of the 
development [9]. PriS is a requirements engineering 
method that incorporates privacy requirements as 
organisational goals that need to be satisfied and 
adopts the use of privacy process patterns as a way 
to: (a) describe the effect of privacy requirements on 
business processes; and (b) facilitate the 
identification of the system architecture that best 
supports the privacy-related business processes [6, 
17]. Islam et al. use natural language patterns with 
Hohfeld legal taxonomy to extract security 
requirements from laws and combine them with the 
ISO/IEC policies and finally trace the identified 
requirements into the secure system design [21,23].  
Four methodological activities are used to evaluate 
existing security and privacy requirements for legal 
compliance [24]. The approach in particular 
prioritises the requirements and establishes 
traceability links from requirements to legal texts.  A 
model based process is proposed to support security 
and privacy requirements engineering using a set of 
concepts such as goal, actor, constraint, and threat 
[8].   
On the other hand, there are works that focus on 
the security and privacy issues of the cloud 
computing domain. Mulazzani et al. [25] demonstrate 
that attackers can exploit data duplication technique 
to access customer data by obtaining hash code of the 
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stored file. A decision support tool based on cost and 
benefits and risk is proposed for the public IaaS cloud 
migration [10]. The cost modelling tool enables users 
to model IT infrastructure using UML. A goal-drivel 
approach is introduced to analyse security and 
privacy risks of cloud based system [2]. Goals, 
threats and risks are consider from three main 
components data, service/application, and technical 
and organisational measure. Some works identify the 
security and privacy threats. For instance, Pearson 
identify that privacy threats differ depending on the 
type of cloud scenario and lack of user control, 
potential unauthorized secondary usage, data 
proliferation are more dominate in public cloud [4]. 
Side-channel attack can instantiate new VMs of a 
target virtual machine so that the new VM can 
potentially monitor the cache hosted on the same 
physical machine [18]. There are four possible places 
where faults can occur in cloud computing: provider-
inner, provider-across, provider user and user-across 
[5]. It is necessary to address any fault arising from 
these places within the cloud infrastructure. There is 
also work that shares some synergy with ours and 
which we plan to further explore and if possible 
integrate to our approach, such as the work by Vivas 
et. al [26] on security assurance. 
The presented works are important and provide 
solid contribution for understanding security and 
privacy issues of the system context. However none 
of the above works focuses on defining a framework 
to support elicitation and analysis of security and 
privacy requirements and the selection of an 
appropriate cloud deployment model based on these 
requirements. Our work fills that gap.   
 
6. Conclusions 
Before migrating their services, data and 
applications to the cloud, organisations need to 
understand and control the issues that could pose any 
potential risks of using the Cloud. Security and 
privacy issues and threats and vulnerabilities can be 
different for different cloud deployment models. 
Moreover, organisations might have different security 
and privacy requirements from a cloud based system.  
In this paper, we have demonstrated a framework 
that provides a language and a process to support the 
selection of cloud deployment models based on an 
organisations security and privacy requirements. We 
have integrated Secure Tropos and PriS to develop 
the security and privacy requirements engineering 
method for the cloud. The application of our work to 
a real case study has been very promising. The case 
study results identified a list of security and privacy 
requirements and two different deployment scenario 
that are relevant for the organizational context.  
However, there is more work that needs to be done. 
Our overall aim is to provide a complete framework 
that will support organisations in understanding the 
risks and challenges with respect to security and 
privacy of migrating their operations to the cloud. In 
doing so, we believe it is important to develop tools 
and automated mechanisms to support organisations 
to analyse their security and privacy requirements 
and perform a full risk analysis of a potential cloud 
migration. We have started some effort to develop 
such tools, for example we have an initial modelling 
tool to support the development of relevant models of 
our framework based on the Open Models Initiative 
platform (www.openmodels.at). Our future work will 
be dedicated towards extending that tool, adding 
automated analysis techniques and validating our 
framework using other scenarios.  
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Appendix A 
Cloud Deployment Scenario Template 
 
Template ID:
Section 1
Deployment Scenario Type Actors Involved
Scenario Description
Hosting Type Organisational Goals
Security / Privacy Constraints
Section 2
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Appendix B 
Public Cloud Deployment Scenario for GNG 
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Template ID: 01
Section 1
Deployment Scenario Type Actors Involved
Public Cloud Public Organisation
Private Organisation
Scenario Description
This Scenario is based on a Public Cloud Deployment model, related to
 the Receive Document organisational goal of the Greek National Gazette. 
The GNG depends on Public and Private Organisations to receive the 
document.
Hosting Type Organisational Goals
Third-Party Location Receive Document
Security / Privacy Constraints
Ensure System Availability, Ensure Document Integrity  
Ensure Sender Eligibility, Ensure Data Privacy, Ensure User Unlinkability
Section 2
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Appendix C 
Private Cloud Deployment Scenario for GNG 
Template ID: 02
Section 1
Deployment Scenario Type Actors Involved
Private Cloud Public Organisation
Private Organisation
Scenario Description
This Scenario is based on a Private Cloud Deployment model, related to
 the Receive Document organisational goal of the Greek National Gazette. 
The GNG depends on Public and Private Organisations to receive the 
document.
Hosting Type Organisational Goals
On-premise Location Receive Document
Security / Privacy Constraints
Ensure System Availability, Ensure Document Integrity  
Ensure Sender Eligibility, Ensure Data Privacy, Ensure User Unlinkability
Section 2
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